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Introduction 
This paper is about one aspect of Britain’s electricity trading system, its 
advantages and its weaknesses concerning the incentives it provides or fails to provide for 
the location of generation. (Similar considerations apply to the location of loads, though 
these are less responsive to locational influences exerted by the trading system). 
The optimal location of generation in the short-run is a matter of determining the 
unit commitment and dispatch of the existing generation park so as to minimise the cost 
of generation hour by hour, subject to security constraints and taking account of 
transmission losses. In the long-run, choices of the locational pattern of new plant 
construction and of the decommissioning of old plant should be influenced by their 
effects upon the cost of the transmission investment that they entail. 
In systems with a gross pool, such as in New York, Ireland and New Zealand, 
there is a central dispatch. This, taking account of transmission losses and constraints, can 
produce locational marginal prices. Expectations concerning their future levels provide 
signals relevant to the location of new generation. Thus both in the short-run and in the 
long-run these systems provide locational incentives. In some of them, where the long-
run incentives to investment provided by the uncertain prospect of future price spikes are 
deemed insufficient, capacity requirements are imposed upon (what in Britain are called) 
“suppliers”. These too can embody a locational element, as in the LICAP arrangements in 
New York and proposed for New England. 
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In the British system, there is a net pool, and two cashout prices rather than one 
emerge from the Balancing Mechanism. This is Britain’s version of what is elsewhere 
called the spot market, regulation market or real time market. Unit commitment is left to 
the generators, while National Grid, as system operator re-dispatches so as to preserve 
balance and to deal with transmission constraints. For the latter purpose, it constrains on 
here and constrains off there (though such actions may serve other purposes too). This 
costs it money, providing the occasion for it to weigh up the operating cost of  dealing 
with constraints against the capital cost of removing them. But locational prices do not 
emerge from this process and no account is taken of locational differences in marginal 
losses. These are two defects of the short-run locational incentives provided by the 
British system.  
On the other hand, the British system scores highly with respect to long-run 
locational incentives. Instead of providing these by participants’ expectations of future 
locational differences in energy prices, and maybe capacity prices, Britain provides them 
through locational differences in the transmission costs borne by generators. National 
Grid’s Transmission Use of System Charges vary locationally to reflect the results of an 
“Incremental Cost” analysis. But although these may be roughly right, National Grid’s 
approach is imperfect, even though it has evolved to meet some past criticism1. This 
paper points to its remaining defects after first tackling the short-run issue of the 
treatment of losses. 
Losses 
The cost of transmission losses in Britain is recovered by adjusting the metered 
volumes of all transmission users by a uniform percentage to reflect the actual total losses 
incurred in each settlement period. In other words generator’s injections are all treated as 
being larger than the withdrawals by the buyers by the same percentage. The settlement 
system does recognise that transmission losses could be allocated on a locational basis, 
but the locational transmission loss factors which would be used to calculate this are 
                                                 
1 Ralph Turvey "NETA and Transmssion" (Beesley lecture 1999) in Regulating Utilities ed. Colin 
Robinson. Edward Elgar 2001 
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currently set to zero. Thus the bilateral market (and the Balancing Mechanism) disregards 
locational variations in loss factors, resulting in economic inefficiency.  
Zonal transmission loss factors 
Setting the transmission loss factors to reflect geographical variations in losses 
would be one way of ensuring that these variations were taken into account in generation 
scheduling, It was proposed (Modification P82) that average zonal transmission losses 
should be allocated for each Grid Supply Point group on an ex-ante basis throughout the 
year in England and Wales. This  was fiercely resisted by some northern generators. It 
was rejected  by the Balancing and Settlement Code Panel but nevertheless was approved 
by OFGEM.  Following a subsequent public consultation on the application of Average 
Zonal Transmission Losses and on the basis of further work commissioned from 
OXERA, the Government then took “the view that any positive net benefit that might 
flow from the introduction of Average Zonal Transmission Losses is ambiguous, 
especially in light of the wide margins of the upper and lower limits of the costs and 
benefits.”2 The work which led the Government to take this view was summarised as 
follows: 
“OXERA employed a load-flow model of the Great Britain electricity 
transmission networks in conjunction with a wholesale electricity market model to 
compare the different outcomes of zonal and uniform loss charging between the 
years 2005/06 and 2009/10.” 
“Notwithstanding the many uncertainties attached to an exercise of this nature, OXERA’s 
base case scenario estimated that the overall benefit in Net Present Value terms from 
the resulting changes in demand response and generator redispatch and relocation 
would possibly amount to £6-55 million . However, it was also proposed that the 
implementation and operational costs of AZTL might range between £3-31 million . It 
was also estimated that AZTL would cause a redistribution of almost £30 million from 
northern generators to southern ones, as the former would pay more of the cost of 
transmission losses while the latter would pay less. The opposite is true for electricity 
suppliers and, by implication, their customers. It is important to bear in mind that a 
redistribution is neither an overall benefit nor cost. 3
 
                                                 
2 Government response to consultation on Transmission losses in a GB electricity market, 
June 2003 
3 Government response to consultation on Transmission losses in a GB electricity market, 
June 2003 
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The proposal has now been resuscitated as Modification Proposal 198, being put forward 
by RWE Npower in December 2005 and is to be examined by an assessment group which 
is to report in May4. It now applies to Great Britain, the  introduction of the British 
Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA) in April 2005 having 
extended the scope of the Code to incorporate Scotland, 
Charging for losses 
An alternative would be for the National Grid to bear the cost of losses, buying 
the energy for them and recovering these costs by geographically differentiated MWh 
charges for them. Such a locational transmission charge for losses could range from one 
which reflected average losses to one which reflected marginal losses. 
This alternative was at one time favoured by National Grid, who believed “that 
the transmission system operator should be responsible for the costs of transmission 
losses and their subsequent charge-out in an economically efficient manner”, although 
they were ambivalent about the use of average or marginal losses. They argued that “This 
option would also deliver the many benefits arising from the SO managing losses; 
including removing potential distortions from the Balancing Mechanism, helping the 
separation of transport and energy prices, consistency with European markets as well as 
consistency with the gas market.”5 By bearing both the cost of losses and those of 
operating its system and of undertaking reinforcements, the National Grid could be 
incentivised to choose the tradeoffs between these costs which would yield a minimum 
cost solution. The argument of course presupposes that  the National Grid would buy the 
energy to meet losses at least as efficiently as suppliers, 
Marginal vs average losses 
The proposal which OXERA was commissioned to study was for a single 
transmission loss factor to be applied in each zone each year thus reflecting annual 
averages of average losses. It seems obvious that this was an inferior device. It would be 
much better to apply time-varying marginal loss factors, differentiated by time of day, 
                                                 
4 IELEXON I Document Reference: P198IRT 6 January 2006troduction of a Zon                               
5 NGC, Response To “Transmission Access And Losses Under Neta” Ofgem Consultation 
Document,  May 2001, Appendix 4, July 2001 
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week and year, thus enabling the market to approximate locationally optimal commitment 
and dispatch.  An example of such marginal loss factors is provided by Table 7,4 of 
National Grid’s most recent Seven Year Statement. It shows the extreme cases to be that 
a small increase in generation in the North has an effectiveness of 94% in meeting 
demand across the system at the time of winter peak.  Whereas a small increase in 
generation in the Peninsula has an effectiveness of 105% in meeting demand by virtue of 
reducing transmission power losses 
If time-varying marginal loss factors which were determined ex ante, and thus 
known to users, were applied, generation would exceed demand by the excess of 
marginal over average losses. This could be: 
 Accepted, allowing the National Grid to be a net seller of energy in practically all 
half hours, increasing the liquidity of the market and providing it with a source of 
revenue consistent with optimal dispatch. Without this revenue source, National 
Grid’s user charges would have to be higher, providing unwanted incentives to 
users and so interfering with economic efficiency. 
 Avoided, by scaling down all marginal loss factors by the same absolute amounts 
so that the absolute  (locational) differences between them are preserved.  
A similar choice applies under the first alternative noted above, namely purchases 
by National Grid to meet losses financed by time varying and locationally differentiated 
MWh charges paid by users. Setting these charges to equal the marginal cost of losses 
would yield a surplus over the cost of providing for losses. Charges reduced by the same 
absolute amount, preserving the differences between them, could avoid this. 
National Grid is currently provided by OFGEM with an incentive to reduce 
losses. This would fit badly with either alternative, for under both of them market 
participants would become incentivised to take account of locational differences in 
marginal losses in their current decisions, including their Balancing Mechanism bids.  If 
the National Grid also faced incentives on the level of losses then they would take actions 
in the Balancing Mechanism even though participants had already internalised these 
costs. In any case, the incentives provided to National Grid require a rethink because 
minimising losses is not the same as minimising the costs of meeting the load which is 
what is wanted.  
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Conclusion re losses 
The application of zonally varying average loss factors is now to be re-examined. 
It would be better still if the study covered time varying marginal transmission loss 
factors. Their introduction would of course have redistributive effects, some of the 
potential losers being more articulate than the potential gainers. It should not, however, 
be regarded as a zero sum game, since there would be real benefits to be weighed against 
real costs. 
Connection charges 
The problem of providing long-run locational cost messages and incentives for 
generation investment and disinvestment forms the subject of the rest of this paper. To 
the extent that locational choices are made with respect to loads the discussion applies to 
the demand side as well. What is at issue are choices between locations where new 
investment or closures will not exacerbate transmission constraints and locations where 
they will. In the latter case, new generation will impose a cost upon the transmission 
operator which will have to choose between  more out-of-merit operation or  transmission 
reinforcement. 
 With transmission use of system charges, users pay monthly or annually either 
according to their capacity or according to maximum metered flows. The schedule of 
charges applied in each particular case is pre-determined. Connection charges provide an 
alternative where charges are determined individually when users are connected. Thus 
they can provide a tailor-made locational differentiation, charges reflecting the estimated 
costs of accomodating additional generation in each particular case. In principle, 
therefore, they are the ideal solution as regards long-run locational incentives. 
Connection charges are usually paid as a lump capital sum. They could, however, 
be spread out over time, being reckoned as the annuitised value of that lump sum. If the 
user closed down, payment to it of a credit reflecting any saving to the transmission 
operator could possibly be made, whereas in the case of annuitised payments users would 
automatically cease to pay upon disconnection. 
Another choice lies between “shallow” and “deep” connection charges. 
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 Under a ‘deep’ approach, generators or new loads connecting to the 
transmission system would pay not only for the cost of the local connection but 
also for the incremental investment made on the wider transmission system to 
accommodate the additional generating capacity or load. Thus the generator or 
user would have to pay for all the additional transmission assets which connection 
would entail, including the costs of reinforcement at remote sites. 
 Under a ‘shallow’ approach, new users would be required to pay only for the local 
assets specifically required to connect them to the transmission system and for 
their specific benefit. The costs of reinforcing the system beyond the connection 
assets would therefore be recovered as part of use of system charges. 
There is obviously room for defining shallowness more or less widely as recent debate 
has demonstrated. 
Because of the indivisibility of plant and equipment and because it may 
sometimes be sensible to increase capacity by more than is immediately required when 
this will cost less than would smaller successive increments, a “deep” cost of connection 
may be incurred to provide spare capacity over and above that immediately needed to 
service a new user. So, if deep connection charges are imposed, there will often be a third 
choice to be made: shall all of the reinforcement cost be borne by the new user, or shall 
the new user cover only part of it, leaving the rest to be covered by any subsequent new 
users? What if no reinforcement is currently necessary to accommodate a new user, but 
the arrival of that new user will bring forward the time when any subsequent  appearance 
on the scene of further new user will necessitate upstream reinforcement? 
If the chosen answer is to share out the cost of upstream reinforcements, then 
users arriving on the scene subsequently will have to contribute towards the cost of the 
past reinforcements which provided the spare capacity that they are now going to utilise. 
Hence when the advent of a new user does not entail costs (other than the shallow cost of 
the immediate connection) because sufficient capacity exists upstream to obviate any 
immediate need for reinforcement, this approach will require the new user to contribute 
towards past reinforcement expenditure.  
The deep approach could have the merit of greater cost reflectivity, the connection 
charge depending upon the particular circumstances of the part of the network affected by 
the advent of a new user. Unfortunately, however, the third choice then has to be faced, 
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involving difficult issues that are avoided with shallow charges. It is clearly acceptable to 
differentiate connection charges according to differences in the (shallow) cost of the 
immediate connection assets that are not shared. But  can it be acceptable to differentiate 
them according to new users’ estimated fractional contribution to either upstream 
reinforcement costs whose optimal scale may depend upon uncertain forecasts of future 
new generation and closures, or according to their contribution to load flows made 
possible by past reinforcement? 
Such problems have led to the choice of shallow connection charging in Britain, 
the Regulator taking the view that 
a deep connection charging methodology is more likely than a shallow charging policy to 
result in charges which could discriminate between similar customers depending on the 
time of their connection. The connection of a new customer in a given location may 
trigger the need for reinforcement of assets which would be shared by all local users. 
Under a deep connection policy, these charges would be charged to the new customer 
despite the fact that they will be shared by other users. Furthermore, given the lumpy 
nature of connection investments, subsequent new users may be able to connect at 
a relatively low cost. Such arrangements will act to distort competition by changing the 
cost base of otherwise similar users.6
In Britain, a shallow connection boundary based on single user assets has thus 
been chosen. Upon the connection to the grid of a new generator or new demand point, 
all assets which are shared or could be shared will now be charged for via use of system 
charges rather than connection charges. Substations (and associated site infrastructure and 
land), generation only spurs, and shared transformer circuits will be charged for via 
use of system charges.  
National Grid’s Use of System charges 
Since the subject under discussion is locational incentives, what is of concern here 
is only the locationally varying element in National Grid’s Use of System charges, i.e. 
differences in these charges between the 21 generation zones and the 14 demand zones. 
Each of the latter group together the Grid Supply points where a distribution network is 
                                                 
6 GEMA, NGC’s proposed GB electricity transmission charging methodologies, The Authority’s 
decisions, December 2004, paragraph 3.28 
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fed, these being the groupings necessary for energy market settlement purposes. The 
generation zones, on the other hand, contain generation nodes whose marginal costs are 
close and which are geographically and electrically proximate. 
National Grid’s methodology 
The Direct Current Load Flow model used to compute the marginal costs of 
investment in the transmission system requires the following inputs relating to system 
peak conditions: 
o  Nodal demand information 
o Nodal generation information 
o Transmission circuits between these nodes and their impedances 
o The lengths of these routes, the proportions of each which is overhead line 
or cable and the respective voltage levels 
The other input data are the cost of transmission reinforcement, expressed in 
terms of ratios  of 132kV overhead line, 132kV cable, 275kV overhead line, 275kV cable 
and 400kV cable to the cost of 400kV overhead line. Here, costs are expressed as the 
annuitised values of the transmission infrastructure capital investment required to 
transport 1 MW over 1km with an addition for  maintenance costs. These circuit cost 
ratios are used to derive what are called “circuit expansion factors”, the analysis being 
rather quaintly expressed in terms of increases or decreases in units of kilometres (km) of 
the transmission system for a one Megawatt injection to the system. 
For a completely accurate representation of power flows an AC load flow 
transport model would need to be used to consider voltage issues, but the difference in 
results would be small 
The demand data for each node are based upon the Grid Supply point demands 
under Average Cold Spell conditions forecast by Users. The generation information, on 
the other hand is not a forecast of how peak demand will be met. Instead, it is arrived at 
by taking the sum of generators’ export capacities and scaling them all down in the same 
proportion to the point where they will just meet the load. A load flow analysis can then 
derive the resultant pattern of flows based on the network impedances, assuming every 
circuit has as much capacity as needed. 
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This specifies an adequate baseline network which is just adequate to convey the 
flows resulting from the assumed levels and patterns of demand and generation. The 
model can then calculate for an injection of an extra MW of generation at each node 
accompanied by a corresponding additional one MW of demand at a reference node, the 
required increase or decrease in Megawatt-kilometres on all routes of the network. This 
allows calculation of marginal costs, though National Grid chooses to express the result 
in terms of marginal 400 kV MWkm by applying the  circuit expansion factors. Marginal 
cost will, of course, be negative for additional injection in deficit zones. Marginal cost for 
demand is equal and opposite in sign to marginal cost for generation at that node.  The 
choice of reference point affects the level of marginal cost but not the differences 
between nodes. MW-weighted averages of marginal costs for each group of demand and 
each group of generation nodes are employed to obtain zonal marginal costs. 
These calculations assume that the transmission system is sized so that it is just 
adequate to accommodate the flows resulting from the postulated peak generation and 
demands. But since security standards require that it should still be able to accommodate 
them in the event of any one of a number of plausible single and double circuit outages, 
the zonal marginal costs are all multiplied by 1.8. This multiplier is derived from the 
(surprisingly uniform) ratios for all nodes between the results of a load flow model that 
allows for such contingencies and the simple model which does not. The model that 
allows for contingencies calculates load flows along each circuit for each of a series of 
plausible outages and finds the maximum flow along each circuit. For each node the sum 
of the derivatives of these maxima with respect to net injection at that node, each 
multiplied by circuit equivalent length, then yields a marginal cost expressed in circuit 
equivalent length. It is these “secured” marginal costs which average 1.8 times the 
marginal costs computed for zero contingencies, (oddly denoted “intact” marginal costs 
by National Grid). 
In order that National Grid can recover the total revenue allowed to it by the 
Regulator, a constant non-locational residual tariff for generation and demand, which 
includes infrastructure substation asset costs, is calculated and added to the marginal 
costs to determine National Grid’s Use of System tariff.  
There has been much discussion of how the tariff is apportioned between demand 
and generation. Demand charges are based on the average of half-hourly metered or 
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profiled demand during the Triad. (This is the half hour of system peak demand and the 
two half hours of next highest demand separated from it and from each other by at least 
10 days, between November and February.) Generator charges in positive charging zones 
are based on their highest Transmission Entry Capacities applicable for the year. In 
negative charging zones, charges are based on a triad-type average of metered volumes. 
A proposal to charge only demand was turned down by the Gas and Electricity Markets 
Authority even though it recognised that once the market has adjusted, the change in 
apportionment would make no difference, since in all cases the amount of the tariff will 
constitute a gap between the net sum received by the generator from the net cost to the 
purchaser.  However, consumers might lose during the adjustment period,7
National Grid in its role as System Operator keeps the electricity system in 
balance (known as “energy balancing”) and looks after security of supply 
(“system balancing”). These balancing costs include the costs it incurs in constraining off 
some generation and constraining on generation elsewhere in order to deal with 
transmission congestion. They are recovered from customers in proportion to their 
Metered Volumes adjusted for transmission losses. Thus despite a locational element in 
these costs there is no locational element in the way they are recovered. National Grid has 
justified this on the grounds that “it is not possible to take balancing actions on a “one 
action, one reason” basis. For example, resolution of transmission constraints is one of 
many reasons underlying SO balancing actions and allocating the cost unambiguously is 
impossible.”8
Modeling incremental capacity costs 
Incremental capacity costs are expressed as the costs per MWkm of newly built 
lines and cables of different voltages although additional capacity is not always provided 
by constructing new circuits. Conductor re-profiling (allowing the conductors to operate 
at a higher temperature), re-conductoring and voltage uprating constitute alternative 
extensively used methods of adding to capacity. National Grid have, however, produced 
                                                 
7 OFGEM letter 31.10.2005 
8 GB Transmission Charging: Final Methodologies Consultation, 20 August 2004, page 50. 
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an analysis which shows that, allowing for that fact, the cost of new build does provide a 
reasonable estimate of the cost of providing incremental capacity.9  
An alternative approach to cost analysis has the desirable property that the 
estimates resulting are consistent with the way in which reinforcements are actually 
decided and costed. It proceeds by using  engineering estimates of the costs of 
reinforcements that are actually planned or of the reinforcements that would be chosen in 
order to deal with alternative potential load increments.  
 
GB SYS 
Boundary 
Required reinforcement  
 
(as identified in phase 1 of 
Transmission Investment 
for Renewable 
Generation) 
Annuitised 
distance  
-related cost 
 including 
 O&M 
 
£/kW/yr 
Generation 
Tariff 
differential 
 between 
receiving and 
sending end 
£/kW/yr 
B3 Sloy 
Export 
(SHETL) 
275/132kV substation at Sloy 
 & 132kV line Works 2.6 2.4 
B4 
(Also B1, B2) 
SHETL-SPTL 
Beauly – Denny 400 
kV line (220Km) 17.1 9.2 
B5  North – 
South 
(SPTL) 
3 Mechanically Switched Capacitors   
Series reactor @ Windyhill  
Switchgear replacement 
@ Easterhouse and Clyde Mill 
substation 
1.1 0.8 
B6 SPTLNGC Reconductor Eastern Interconnector, 
Upgrade Western Interconnector. 
New substations. 
11.2 3.9 
B7 North - 
Midlands 
Predominately  
reactive compensation 
3.4 3.9 
 
                                                 
9 GB Transmission Charging: Use of System Charging Methodology Revised Proposals 
Consultation Version 2, 20 December 2004, section 5.5 
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National Grid has provided such estimates for five reinforcements of pinch points 
in the grid and compared them, excluding the costs corresponding to substation works, 
with the differences in the model-derived tariff as shown above:10
The approximation is not particularly good. Note that the reinforcements are 
proposed for network boundaries representing transmission pinch points (flowgates). The 
capability of a boundary is the maximum transfer across the boundary that can be 
tolerated for a particular pattern and level of demand and generation without breaching 
security criteria. This means that following any of a large number of plausibly possible 
contingencies, such as fault outages of transmission circuits, there are no overloaded 
items of transmission equipment, no unacceptable voltages, and all demand is supplied 
(save for interruptible demand).  An engineering analysis of marginal costs node by node 
would proceed by calculating Power Transfer Distribution Factors  ― the incremental 
flows through each part of the transmission network that would result from a postulated 
increment in nodal generation or demand and an increment of opposite sign at the 
reference node. Each such cross-border incremental flow which would lead to a flow 
across the boundary (plus an allowance  to take account of non-average conditions e.g. 
relating to power station availability, weather and demand) in excess of that boundary’s 
capability would then be multiplied by the unit costs of reinforcing that boundary’s 
capability. 
Looking at the matter in this way immediately reveals four more problems or 
complications. The first is that as well as expenditure on lines and cables, the cost of 
reinforcement includes expenditure on substations, which are excluded from National 
Grid’s incremental cost calculations. The second is that reinforcements are costed as if an 
extra one MW were involved whereas in fact they are lumpy investments that 
accommodate hundreds of additional MW. The third is to remember that increments can 
be negative, i.e. that decrements should also be considered because decremental cost may 
differ from incremental cost. Lastly, there is the point that the model is designed to 
provide market participants with a cookery book formulation of tariff determination. 
 
                                                 
10 op.cit. Table 2 
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Transformers & switchgear 
Substation assets are not included in the cost calculations. The reason for this lies 
in the nature of the cost model which is formulated entirely in terms of circuit lengths by 
circuit type. National Grid has sought to justify this by asserting that “generally 
substation costs are non-locational”11. Yet, as the examples above demonstrate, 
expenditure on transformers, switchgear and load flow devices does form part of 
reinforcement costs. Estimation of marginal costs made by applying Power Distribution 
Transfer Factors to engineering  estimates of the cost of relieving constraints would 
obviously include them. 
The cost model used has evolved from an even simpler initial version which was a 
pure “transport” model, unrelated to the way National Grid describes possible needs for 
reinforcement in its Seven Year Statements. These Statements describe the ability of the 
British Transmission System to accommodate further generation and demand in different 
zones in terms of the thermal and voltage limits on the bulk transfer of power across 
certain system boundaries. “17 boundaries have historically reflected some of the main 
weaknesses on the interconnected system.  Such weaknesses can lead to the need to 
restrict power flows across the system; possibly through the potentially uneconomic 
constrained operation of generating plant. Alternatively, transmission weaknesses may 
be removed through some form of transmission reinforcement. Although the most critical 
boundaries may not now be precisely the same as those studied, the 17 boundaries 
which have been used remain relevant for illustrating system trends and limitations.” 
“The 17 zones have been grouped into five opportunity groups, namely: VERY LOW, 
LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH AND VERY HIGH. These categorisations are intended to provide 
a broad indication of the relative level of possible opportunities for connection within 
individual zones, or groups of zones, without the need for further major inter-zonal 
transmission reinforcement.”12 These, implicitly, are statements about marginal costs. 
Indivisibility 
The second problem with National Grid’s cost analysis is that it assumes 
transmission capability to be exactly proportioned to what is dictated by the assumed 
                                                 
11 GB Transmission Charging: Final Methodologies Consultation, 20 August 2004 
12 National Grid, 2005 Seven Year Statement 
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pattern and level of generation and loads and by security requirements. Line costs are 
expressed per Megawatt kilometre and it is implicitly assumed that any necessary amount 
of Megawatt kilometres can be installed. Yet investment in lines and cable, and in the 
substation capacity that is omitted from the analysis, is unavoidably lumpy: equipment 
comes in standard sizes and additions to capacity may sensibly be sized to allow for 
future load growth beyond that which has necessitated them. The result is that many 
individual lines, transformers and switchgear are underutilised so that up to some point 
they can accommodate increased load flows without any need for reinforcement. The 
consequence is that an increased flow of x MVA over a particular component of the grid 
may lead to no reinforcement if x does not exceed a certain amount but will lead to a 
reinforcement which augments capacity by a larger amount than x if it does. In other 
words to allow the analysis to run in terms of marginal costs it has to pretend that there is 
no indivisibility in transmission plant and equipment. 
This is wrong but, I now argue, it is nevertheless unavoidable! 
Consider what, in principle, is an appropriate concept of the cost of an increment 
of x MVA in the peak flow along a particular line or cable or through a substation?  
1. If it does not necessitate immediate reinforcement, it will nevertheless 
bring forward the time in the future when any subsequent growth in that 
flow will require reinforcement. Hence the opportunity cost of x is the 
expected probability of this multiplied by the increase in the present worth 
of the cost of that future reinforcement due to bringing it forward.  
2. If it does necessitate immediate reinforcement and this raises capacity by 
more than x MVA, it may put off the time in the future when any 
subsequent flow growth will require reinforcement. Hence from the cost of 
the reinforcement must be deducted  the product of the expected 
probability of this and the decrease in the present worth of the cost of that 
future reinforcement due to postponing it. 
 These are concepts without appeal to a practical mind. Yet, in practice, account 
does have to be taken of concepts as difficult as the above even if they are expressed in 
another way. Consider the choice between a small and a large reinforcement when it is 
clear that the latter would turn out to have been cheaper if possible subsequent further 
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demands or new generation did in fact materialise. The decision involves risk, so it is 
necessary to decide who is best placed to bear it.  
The DNO, generator or large consumer responsible for the increased flow which 
triggers off the reinforcement could pay the whole cost (either as a lump sum or, 
annuitised, as part of its annual Transmission Use of System Charges). It could then be 
partly repaid by further users if and when they came along. 
Alternatively, National Grid could bear the whole cost. In this case, both the 
DNO, generator or large consumer responsible for the increased flow, and further users if 
and when they came along, would share out that cost in the charges they pay. These 
would then equal unit cost grossed up so that the expected present worth of the revenue 
they would generate would cover that whole cost, thus allowing for the futurity and the 
uncertainty of the arrival of further users.  This amounts to making an allowance for the 
expected average degree of underutilisation of such assets. The charges could take the 
form either of a lump sum or, annuitised, as part of annual Transmission Use of System 
Charges 
It seems reasonable to say that which alternative is to be preferred depends on 
whether National Grid, the DNO or sometimes the generator is better placed to foresee 
future developments. In all cases, charges should be based on unit costs multiplied by 
coefficients exceeding unity to allow for the fact that their indivisibility causes assets to 
be underutilised on average. 
This does not mean that these coefficients can be computed by estimates of the 
extent of spare capacity currently existing in the system, for there are, of course, other 
causes of the underutilisation of assets. The major one is the provision of redundancy in 
order to meet security standards. This is taken account of in a simple way in National 
Grid’s calculations by the  1.8 multiplier. A much lesser one is that long run changes in 
the location of generation and loads may have falsified the expectations upon which some 
circuits or substations were designed. Thus National Grid was right to abandon13 its 
                                                 
13 National Grid, GB Transmission Charging: Final Methodologies Consultation, 20 August 2004. 
Page 46 
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original idea of treating circuits identified as having spare capacity as less costly to invest 
in because there was a buffer before new investment would be required. This had been 
previously modelled in their transport model by reducing the length of these routes to 
75% of the original length to reflect the reduced cost. This failed to recognise the cost of 
the corresponding spare capacity provided in sizing new capacity. 
Reversibility 
Discussion of optimal pricing in terms of the cost of increments makes it too easy 
to forget that increments can be negative. The principle that users should be required to 
cover the costs of adding to the network imposed by additional flows is matched by the 
principle that the saving in their charges if they reduce flows should reflect the resultant 
saving in National Grid’s costs. National Grid’s model, with its assumption of 
divisibility, yields marginal cost estimates which apply equally to marginal increments 
and marginal decrements. 
All this overlooks the asymmetry between increments and decrements which is 
particularly obvious when the indivisibility and durability of plant and equipment is 
recognised. Putting in additional capacity entails a cost, while using existing capacity less 
may provide no saving, at least immediately. Only when the time comes to replace old 
switchgear or an old circuit, may  it be possible to do it more cheaply than if flows had 
not diminished. (Nor will O & M costs fall much if at all while the old switchgear or 
circuit continues in use.) Otherwise the cost saving resulting from a decrement will be as 
large as the cost of providing for an increment only when the occurrence of a decrement 
obviates the need to reinforce to cope with an increment in the load flow resulting from 
the actions of some other user. Thus the appropriate message and incentive given to users 
contemplating increased generation or demand should be much stronger than that given 
to users contemplating reductions. Yet Transmission Use of System Charges provide 
symmetrical incentives for increments and decrements.  
Once again, the only practicable procedure is to take an average ―  of what is 
appropriate for users who may expand their activities and of what is appropriate for users 
who may contract their activities. If it seems equally likely that users will expand and that 
users will contract, then a simple average would be appropriate.  Thus if marginal cost 
downward is practically zero, charges should be set at half marginal cost upward, plus the 
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uniform addition necessary for National Grid to earn its allowed revenue. If a simple look 
at marginal cost downward shows that it is one half of marginal cost upward, then the 
locational differences in charges should be set at ¾ of locational differences in marginal 
cost upward. Locational differences in National Grid’s  Use of System Charges are biased 
upward by its failure  to take any account of this point. 
Replicability 
National Grid makes its model and data available so that market participants can 
check its mathematics, understand its results and examine the effect upon charges of any 
change in the assumed level and pattern of generation and demand which they choose to 
postulate. This is desirable in itself, but prevents the National Grid from using more 
realistic data which embody its commercially confidential knowledge and its uncertain 
but sensible forecasts about the commissioning and decommissioning of generation plant 
and about fuel costs. 
The generation and load data used come from National Grid’s SYS. Customer-
based demand forecasts are used which show stronger growth than National Grid’s own 
‘base’ projections. As regards generation, existing plant and new generation for which an 
Agreements has been made are included, while speculative new projects, potential 
closure of existing stations or other developments that may have been discussed with the 
relevant customer are not included without the agreement of the customer. 
There are therefore two artificialities in the way load flows are projected. One is 
that, instead of an approximation to merit order generation, all generators are assumed to 
produce at the same percentage of their capacity. The second is that, as National Grid 
explicitly recognises, “the ‘SYS background’ does not necessarily represent the most 
likely outturn. For example, it is reasonable to suppose that new applications for power 
station connections will be received, some power stations will close and some contracts 
for generation projects may be modified or terminated.  This may lead to the need to vary 
the planned future development of the transmission system to meet changing system 
requirements.”14
                                                 
14 National Grid, 2005 Seven year Statement, section of Introduction entitled The GB SYS 
Background. 
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Taking the first point on board, National Grid has recognised that, in principle, a 
merit order approach would ”better fit the principle of the model, namely an analysis of 
the peak system conditions“ though they “have some concerns regarding such 
an approach, not least how to ensure transparency, and how to avoid the potential 
for volatility year on year” but ”undertake to consider this idea in the future”.15
Regarding the second point, National Grid has taken account of its current views 
on the various generation and demand uncertainties and used Monte Carlo analysis to 
derive probabilistic ranges of net transfers across each boundary, year by year. The 
analysis randomly selects generator openings and closures, balancing the probable 
generation capacity against probable peak demand and probable plant margin. The results 
show that for some boundaries the SYS transfers generally lie towards the top of the 
likely transfer range whereas there are others where the SYS transfers generally lie 
towards the bottom. But it is the relationship of these probabilistic transfers to boundary  
capabilities which indicates which boundaries would probably require reinforcement 
because of the increased flows across them resulting from a postulated incremental flow 
between any given node and the reference node.  So the model errs in treating any 
increase in flow across any boundary  at the time of peak demand on the GB system as a 
whole as imposing a reinforcement cost. 
Conclusions 
A proper treatment of losses is perfectly possible.  
The existence of different ways of providing long-run locational incentives is illustrated 
by the contrast between the  Standard Market Design in the USA with the British system. 
Under the former, the relative merits of different locations for future investment are 
illuminated by long-run expectations about future short-run market results. In Britain, on 
the other hand, locational messages and incentives are conveyed by National Grid’s 
transmission tariffs reflecting long-run cost estimates. Thus National Grid does the right 
thing with its Use of System charges, although it does it imperfectly.  
 
                                                 
15 National Grid, GB Transmission Charging: Final Methodologies Consultation 20 August 2004 
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